Michigan Law Review
Volume 50

Issue 5

1952

DISCIPLINE OF JUDGES
Frederic M. Miller
Member, Iowa bar; Drake University

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, and the Judges Commons

Recommended Citation
Frederic M. Miller, DISCIPLINE OF JUDGES, 50 MICH. L. REV. 737 (1952).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol50/iss5/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

1952]

DISCIPLINE OF JunGES

737

DISCIPLINE OF JUDGES:(.
Frederic M. Millert

I. Appellate Courts and Trial Courts of General Jurisdiction
most of the states, judges of the appellate courts and of the trial
courts of general jurisdiction are subject to discipline or removal from
office by impeachment at the hands of the legislature, pursuant to constitutional provisions analogous to those applicable to the Federal Judiciary. Such proceedings are seldom instituted. The survey indicates
that, during the 20 year period from 1928 to 1948, only three impeachment proceedings were prosecuted and in all three the defense prevailed.
Reaction to the adequacy of the foregoing constitutional provisions
varies. In a substantial number of states it is indicated that the judges
have been uniformly of such high character and integrity that there
has been no occasion to invoke disciplinary proceedings so that there is
no need for change. In some jurisdictions, it is indicated that the
constitutional provisions are too cumbersome: the legislature is in session for a relatively short period bi-annually, an impeachment trial
would unduly disrupt the session and, therefore, would be authorized
only in the most Hagrant case so that the constitutional provisions are
inadequate. In other jurisdictions it is indicated that the cumbersome
proceedings of impeachment provide a necessary deterrent to ill-advised
and unwarranted attacks upon the judiciary for personal or political
purposes.
A vital element in the usual constitutional provision for impeachment is the rule of law that, where the constitution of a state sets forth
the grounds for discipline of a judge and the procedure to be invoked
therefor, the legislature has no power to provide other grounds for discipline or other methods of trial.1 Accordingly, in most of the states,
judges of appellate courts and courts of general original jurisdiction
are subject to discipline only through impeachment pursuant to con-
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,. This article is a report prepared for the Survey of the Legal Profession. The Survey
is securing much of its material by asking competent persons to write reports in connection
with various parts and aspects of the whole study. Reports are released for publication in
legal periodicals, law reviews, magazines and other media as soon as they have been approved by the Survey Council's Committee on Publications. Thus the information contained in Survey reports is given promptly to the bar and to the public. Such publication
also affords opportunities for criticisms, corrections, and suggestions. When this Survey has
been completed, the Council plans to issue a final comprehensve report containing its findings, conclusions, and recommendations.
t Member, Iowa bar; Lecturer in law, Drake University, Des Moines.-Ed.
1 30 Am. Jur. 736 (1940); 48 C.J.S. 975 (1947); Comoy v. Hallowell, 94 Neb. 794,
144 N.W. 895 (1913); State v. Dearth, 201 Ind. 1, 164 N.E. 489 (1929); Falloon v.
Clark, 61 Kan. 121, 58 P. 990 (1899).
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stitutional provisions, and any change in the power to discipline such
judges would require constitutional amendments.
Notwithstanding the fact that in most states judges of the type now
being considered may be disciplined or removed from office only by
impeachment, there are constitutional provisions to the effect that, in
addition to impeachment, such a judge is subject to discipline and
removal by other methods. These include: Arkansas, a conviction in
crimina_l proceedings of bribery or corruption automatically forfeits judicial office; California, a conviction of "a crime involving moral turpitude" requires the disbarment of a judge and his removal from office;2
Louisiana, by a special court of seven judges; Maryland, by the governor upon conviction in a court of law of incompetency, a willful
neglect of duty, misbehavior in office or any other crime; Massachusetts,
by address of the governor to both houses of the legislature, and by the
governor and the council for advanced age or physical or mental disability; Michigan, by the governor when the legislature is not i11 session
on written charges after hearing, or by a special three judge court convened upon recommendation of the bar grievance committee after secret
hearing with right of appeal to the supreme court; New Hampshire,
, by address of the governor to both houses of the legislature; New York,
by a special court on the judiciary; Rhode Island, by the legislature
abolishing the court and creating a new one; California, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin, by joint resolution of both houses of the legislature. In Oregon a criminal trial and conviction for incompetency,
corruption, malfeasance, delinquency in office may warrant a judgment
of dismissal from office, or a judge may be recalled through a special
election.
The survey indicates that, in those states having the special consti~tional provisions noted above, no judge has been removed from
office through such proceedings during the 20 year period from 1928
to 1948. The record of judges of the type now considered would appear
to be one of outstanding character and integrity.

II. Inferior Courts

In practically every state there are inferior judicial tribunals to
which the constitutional provisions for discipline and removal by impeachment do not apply. The legislatures have the power to provide
for the discipline and removal of judges of such courts and the judges
are subject to discipline and disbarment by the usual proceedings pro2

See 22 So. Cal. L. Rev. 249 et seq. (1949).
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vided therefor. 3 The survey indicates that, as to such judges, the legislatures have provided for the usual type of ouster proceedings applicable to other public officers not subject to impeachment, and the
courts have invoked their inherent power to discipline and disbar such
judges. In a number of cases such a judge has been first tried for a
criminal offense and upon conviction has resigned and has been disbarred.
The record of removals of judges of these inferior courts is not as
readily accessible as in the cases of impeachment so that an accurate
enumeration of such removals has not been possible. The survey does
indicate, however, that, where grounds exist for action against such a
judge, adequate machinery is provided and a reasonably prompt hearing and adjudication is possible.

III. General Supervision of Courts
As heretofore noted, where the constitution of a state sets forth the
grounds for discipline of a judge and the procedure to be invoked
therefor, the legislature has no power to provide other grounds for discipline or other methods of trial. However, it should be observed that
supervision of courts and judges is not regarded as synonymous with
discipline thereof. Many state constitutions provide for general supervision of the work of trial courts and judges by the court of last resort
and its chief justice. Undoubtedly much of the criticism of courts and
judges could be met if the constitutional powers of supervision of their
work were more effectively exercised than they are at present.
One of the most frequent criticisms of the courts is based upon the
delays that postpone final disposition of controversies between litigants.
It is often said, "Justice delayed is justice denied." The responsibility
for such delays is often as much the fault of the lawyers as it is of the
courts. A solution would appear to require a new approach by both
the courts and the lawyers.
In the federal courts a reasonably satisfactory solution appears to
have been accomplished through the promulgation of new rules of
procedure in law actions as well as equity and, more recently, in criminal procedure, which rules have accelerated the work of the courts
and the lawyers, and in the creation of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts.4 The creation of this office has placed the federal
courts on a much more efficient and effective basis. It has also provided
3 In re Stolen, 193 Wis. 602, 214 N.W. 379, 55 A.L.R. 1255 (1927), and cases cited
therein; In re Rempfer, 51 S.D. 393, 216 N.W. 355, 55 A.L.R. 1346 (1927); In re
Burton, 67 Utah 118, 246 P. 188 (1926); In re Spriggs, 36 Ariz. 262, 284 P. 521 (1930).
4 28 U.S.C. (Supp. IV, 1951) §§601 to 610.
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for elasticity in the assignment of judges so that, whenever a court or
judge becomes overburdened with an excessive number of cases, relief
can be afforded and the judicial work equalized. This has resulted, in
many ways, in a more expeditious and effective functioning of the
courts of the United States. The requirement for periodic reports as
to the status of trial dockets is most helpful. It provides an incentive to
judges to keep their dockets current and provides accurate information
on which to base corrective or remedial measures when such are required. The reforms made by the federal courts have resulted from
effective use of supervisory powers by the Supreme Court and the Chief
Justice. These results were attained through strenuous, persistent, organized action of lawyers, assisted by judges.
In many of the states, the example set by the federal courts has
been emulated through the adoption of improved rules of procedure.
In some of the states, the example set by the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts has also been followed. The most outstanding example of the state administrative office is to be found in New
Jersey. There, under the leadership of Chief Justice Arthur T. Vanderbilt, of New Jersey, order has been established in the place of confusion, and delays have been eliminated to such an extent that the work
of practically every court in the state is now on a current basis.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws has promulgated a model act for an administrator for state courts
which illustrates how the results accomplished by the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts might be achieved through a similar
office under the supervision of the court of last resort of a particular
state.
There has been a growing tendency to provide for retirement of
judges on a basis comparable to that afforded federal judges. This tends
to lessen the embarrassment caused by a judge who has lost the necessary vigor to dispose effectively of the case load of his court.
It is our considered judgment that the remedy for the complaints
now made against judges lies, not in a reform of methods of discipline
of judges, but rather in reforms along the line of supervising the work
of judges. In this field the complaints appear to be well grounded.
Corrective measures are urgently needed. The examples afforded by
the federal courts and by Chief Justice Vanderbilt demonstrate that a
solution is available. The challenge to the lawyers is quite obvious.
The judges may help a great deal but the real impetus for reforms in
this field must come primarily from the lawyers. The lawyers must
meet that challenge if they are to be worthy of their calling.

